Why do some people eat meat? by Clough, David




This work has been submitted to ChesterRep – the University of Chester’s 






Author(s): David Clough  
 
 






Originally published in: Epworth Review 
 
 
Example citation: Clough, D. (2005).  Why do some people eat meat? Epworth 
Review, 32(2), 32-40. 
 
 
Version of item: Author’s post-print  
 
 
Available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10034/135489 
Clough, David. ‘Why do some people eat meat?’ In Epworth Review 32:2 (2005), 32–
40.
[Top of page 32]
Why do some people eat meat?
David Clough, Professor of Theological Ethics, University of Chester
“Why do some people eat meat, daddy?” asked Rebecca, with all the directness of a 
vegetarian five year old, as I was saying goodnight to her. I thought quickly. “Well, 
perhaps they think that other animals do, like lions.” The reply was immediate: “But 
lions need to eat meat: we don’t”. I had to concede the point, and, retrospectively I 
wonder on other grounds at my reasoning: in what sense could the behaviour of 
animals serve as moral justification for human actions? This was clearly an invalid 
argument for killing animals to eat them, and long after Rebecca had gone to sleep 
happy at having won her point, I mused over other possibilities. In this article I 
present the most plausible I have come across, with the aim of assessing whether meat 
eating can be morally justified. In my view, none are sufficient to justify killing 
animals for food where adequate alternative sources of nutrition are available.
Before considering potential answers to Rebecca’s question, however, I must 
address the preliminary issue of whether any justification for meat eating is required 
at all. Do animals matter? If the lives and deaths of animals are of no account, there is 
no need for any moral justification for eating them: the practice is morally irrelevant, 
just as a preference for vanilla ice cream over chocolate is morally irrelevant.
This position, however, is hard to sustain. There is a consensus that all 
vertebrates and probably many invertebrates are capable of experiencing pain,
1 and there is no reason to believe that they do not suffer as a result.2 While a 
substantial moral framework is necessary to establish the claim that causing suffering 
to another creature without a morally sufficient reason is illegitimate, this view 
commands a widespread consensus. Christians have good reason to believe that 
causing animal suffering without justification is immoral: all creation is pronounced 
good by God (Gen. 1); the Mosaic Law provides for the welfare of animals, for 
example by forbidding the muzzling of an ox while it is treading out the grain (Dt. 
25.4); God’s words to Job speak of an intimate concern for non-human creation (Job 
38.39–39.30); Jesus teaches that not one sparrow is forgotten by God (Lk. 12.6), and 
Paul writes of the whole creation groaning with labour pains alongside the church as 
it awaits liberation (Rom. 8.22).3
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Some may agree that causing suffering without justification is illegitimate, but 
hold that painless killing of animals does not require a moral justification. To show 
that killing is problematic whether or not suffering is inflicted, an example from 
Douglas Adams’ The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy is helpful. Adams narrates the 
story of the destruction of the entire planet earth by a Vogon constructor fleet in order 
to clear the way for an inter-galactic bypass.4 Fortunately, the means used are 
humane: the planet and its inhabitants are vaporised instantaneously. Clearly, if 
suffering is the only criterion for moral censure, this attack on earth is morally 
unproblematic. If we take the view that there is a moral problem with the destruction 
of a planet by these means, however, we must be committed to the view that respect 
for life incorporates not merely ensuring that it does not suffer unnecessarily, but that 
its interests—minimally, in this case, its interest in continued existence—are
respected. Many animals consumed by human beings suffer considerably before being 
killed;5 this argument goes further to show that justifying reasons are necessary even 
in the ideal case of an animal who undergoes no additional suffering, such as a wild 
deer killed immediately by a rifle shot.
Animals do matter—by which I mean that we need a sufficient justifying reason 
to cause them unnecessary suffering, or to kill them. Note the modest character of this 
claim: I am not arguing that there are no morally sufficient reasons to kill animals for 
food—indeed, as noted below, I think that there are circumstances in which there are 
such reasons. My point here is that a choice to cause unnecessary suffering to an 
animal or to kill it is a morally significant action, which therefore requires a morally 
sufficient justifying reason. The remainder of this essay is a search for such a reason.
1. People matter more than animals
I believe this statement to be true on the grounds of the distinctive nature of human 
beings in relation to other animals, which has a clear intuitive and biblical basis. It is 
intuitive to care more about the welfare of an ant than that of a bacterium, more for a 
bird than an ant, more for a dog than a bird, and more for a person than a dog. 
Whether we justify this intuition on the basis of intelligence, capacity for suffering, 
complexity of social relationships, or otherwise, the alternative of equal regard for all 
creatures is a moral absurdity.6 In biblical terms, human beings are identified uniquely 
as made in the image of God with a particular role and responsibility (Gen. 1.27–9). 
While Jesus affirms that God watches over every sparrow, he also states that ‘you are 
worth 
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more than many sparrows’ (Mt. 10.31 || Luke 12:7). If we were to discover an alien 
race as advanced, or more advanced, than ourselves, we would have to rethink this 
hierarchy, but it seems clear that in terms of intelligence, social and cultural 
complexity, and ability to manipulate the environment, human beings are without peer 
in the known universe and therefore worthy of a different degree of respect.
To acknowledge that people matter more than animals, however, is not the same 
as believing this to be a morally sufficient reason for killing animals or causing them 
unnecessary suffering. It only justifies such actions if there is an irreconcilable 
conflict between the interests of human beings and other animals. If a hippo is about 
to attack a person, for example, and the only way to prevent the attack is to injure or 
kill it, then the argument that people matter more than animals is a sufficient reason to 
justify a pre-emptive attack on the hippo. More generally, if killing animals for food 
were necessary to human survival, this reason would again be sufficient. In the past, it 
was probably the case that nutrition from animal sources was necessary for human 
survival and development: anthropological studies suggest that the expansion of the 
brain size of homo sapiens was dependent on the rich sources of protein found only 
from animal sources.7 Certain human communities even now are dependent on killing 
animals for their continued existence: this is arguably the case, for example, for Inuit 
communities which are heavily dependent on fish, seals, caribou and other mammals 
in their diet.8 For the vast majority of the world population today, however, a 
nutritionally adequate diet is available that does not rely on killing animals, so we are 
not forced to choose between animal and human welfare. In fact, not eating animals is 
likely to be better for people too, both on the grounds of individual health and global 
food provision.9
To acknowledge that people matter more than animals, then, is not an argument 
for killing animals for food: if their lives do matter, and we do not need to eat them, 
we must find another justifying reason.
2. Perfect harmony in our relationship to animals is unattainable
Sometimes killing animals for food is defended on the grounds that beyond this point 
it is hard to find a morally consistent position. There is some merit in this argument. 
For example, milk and beef production are interrelated, so eating meat but not dairy 
products is not a completely consistent option. Similarly, if in some cases medical 
experimentation on animals is justified—and in rare cases I believe it is10—then 
approving of this may seem at odds with a rejection of meat eating. I think it is simply
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and clearly the case that we cannot find a position of absolute moral purity in our 
relationship to the rest of the animal world. If we stop eating dairy products, and 
abandon all animal experiments, we would still be consuming resources that would 
enable other animals to live in our place if we were absent. In a theological context, 
we could identify this inescapable competition with a fallen creation at odds with 
itself: outside Eden, perfect harmony between God’s creatures is no longer a 
possibility.
While we must give up on the aspiration to have completely clean hands in 
relation to the animal world, however, this is not a good argument for not doing what 
we can to avoid unnecessary animal suffering and death. Moral perfection must not 
become the enemy of moral responsibility. Just as we would not refuse food to a 
starving person on the grounds that we do not have enough food to help all those who 
are starving, so we cannot kill and mistreat animals on the grounds that perfect 
harmony in our relations with them is unattainable.
3. The Bible justifies meat eating
After the flood, God gives Noah and his sons a new permission. In the creation 
narrative, human beings are only given plants for food (Gen. 1.29), now they are 
allowed to eat ‘every moving thing that lives’ (Gen. 9.3).11 The taste for meat is 
clearly quickly acquired: after the Exodus the Israelites tire of eating the manna God 
provides and cry out for meat. They are given by God a multitude of quails—though 
they are struck down for their ingratitude ‘while the meat was still between their 
teeth’ (Num. 11.33). The explicit permission to eat meat is repeated in Deuteronomy: 
when the Israelites say ‘I am going to eat some meat’ God’s reply is that they may eat 
it whenever they want (Dt. 12.20). In the New Testament, the position seems 
unchanged: while there is no record of Jesus eating meat, he helps the disciples catch 
fish, eats fish with them (Luke 5.1–11, 24.42–3; John 21.1–11) and gives fish to the 
crowds to eat (Mt. 15.29–37 & ||). Peter receives a vision of all kinds of animals and 
birds and is told to ‘kill and eat’ (Acts 10.9–16); Paul asserts that no food is unclean 
and identifies those who eat only vegetables as being weak in faith (Rom. 14.2, 14).
There are three reasons why I do not consider this array of texts decisive in 
justifying killing animals for food. The first is that our situation is different in an 
important respect from that of the journeying Israelites or the inhabitants of first 
century Palestine. I have noted above that it is justifiable to kill animals for food 
where there are not nutritionally adequate alternatives: almost certainly this would 
have been 
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true for those journeying in the desert or living on the shores of the Sea of Galilee; it 
is not for most people today.
The second reason we should not quickly reach a conclusion on the basis of 
these texts is that moral awareness develops over time. The discussion of the position 
of slaves and women in the Bible is the clearest example of this. We have come to 
realise—as the authors of these texts did not—that the wider biblical account of what 
it means to be human is at odds with keeping slaves and with treating women as less 
than equal to men.12 Paul’s perspective on the eating of animals, therefore, could be 
limited by the time and place in which he was living in the same way as I would 
suggest some of his thinking about the role of women in the church is so limited. 
Obviously, we cannot make the same argument in relation to the personal example of 
Jesus Christ. Yet the incarnation was God’s self-limitation: a choice to work within a 
creaturely framework of time and place. It is arguable that in first century Palestine 
Jesus had to be male, rather than female, in order to be received as a teacher, whereas 
the same would not be true today; similarly, it may be that at that time he had to 
choose an exclusively male leadership team whereas today he would not.13 Christians 
are called to be followers of Christ, but not slavish imitators: we are called to take up 
our crosses (Mt. 16.28 & ||) but not to be crucified for the redemption of the world; 
we are called to have faith, but not to turn water into wine.14 It may be that Jesus 
Christ chose only male leaders and ate fish, but that we should appoint women and 
men on the basis of their calling, and should not kill animals unnecessarily.
The third reason I do not consider the biblical texts cited to be a decisive 
justification for eating meat is that, just as in the cases of slaves and women, they are 
in tension with a wider biblical perspective that recognises killing to be problematic. 
We have already noted that the creation narrative allows only plants for food: the 
permission to eat meat appears as a second best option, a concession by God after the 
Fall and the flood. This sense is strengthened by the prophetic vision of a time when 
all killing will end, when the wolf and the lamb, the leopard and the goat, the cow and 
the bear, the child and the viper, will live in peace, and no harm will be done on 
God’s holy mountain (Is. 11.6–9). In Romans, Paul shares this vision of a time when 
the whole of creation will be freed from its bondage to rejoice in the freedom of the 
children of God (Rom. 8.20). Killing animals for food had no place in God’s original 
plan for creation, and will have no place when creation is freed from its bonds. In the 
meantime, the Bible recognises that it is sometimes appropriate, but wherever it can 
be avoided, it can be seen in this wider 
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biblical context as a small and humble witness to the inbreaking of God’s reign of 
peace.
4. Animals taste good
I judge this to be a major reason operative in the decisions people make to eat meat: 
among the many sources of nutrition available, like the Israelites, people prefer to 
include meat in their diet. To give up eating animals is a significant sacrifice: it is the 
denial of a source of considerable pleasure. I do not wish to understate the force of 
this point—though I would want to affirm that joyful feasting remains a possibility 
without animals on the menu. I do wish to claim, however, that if the lives and 
welfare of animals matter, as I argued above, then human pleasure in consuming them 
is an insufficient moral justification for inflicting on them unnecessary suffering and 
premature death. To live a morally authentic life requires denying ourselves very 
many pleasures we would enjoy if the interests of others were of no account: not 
eating animals is just one example.
5. Nature, tradition, economics and habit
Meat eating is a longstanding human practice: I have already dated the beginning of 
the practice to very early in human history both in biblical and archaeological terms. 
Meat may well have been essential to human evolution, and our digestive system has 
developed to derive nutrition from it. This biological reality has a cultural dimension: 
we are deeply immersed in the rituals of meat eating; ‘Christmas isn’t Christmas 
without a turkey’, is one example. The scale of our consumption of meat means this 
cultural fact is also an economic one: the meat industry generates significant income 
for the national economy and is a sizable employer in the UK and elsewhere, and any 
major shift away from meat eating would have consequences for many livelihoods.
For human beings to switch to an exclusively vegetarian diet, therefore, would 
be an evolutionary and cultural novelty with an economic cost. I do not underestimate 
the scale of the change required, but, as in the individual case of dietary preference 
just mentioned, I do not consider that arguments simply from the combined 
momentum of biology, tradition, income generation, or employment can finally 
morally outweigh the interests of animals. If a practice is morally objectionable, such 
secondary considerations cannot finally be decisive: some evolutionary traits—such 
as abandoning the weak and reproductively unfit—some traditions—such as bear 
baiting—some means of income generation—such as elephant poaching—and some 
kinds of employment
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—such as lion taming in the circus ring—must be judged illegitimate whatever their 
other benefits. 
Tradition and culture find a place in individual lives, and I do not underestimate 
the difficulty of changing dietary habits in a context where meat eating has such a 
strong cultural meaning. In the end, however, we are capable of effecting changes 
even in our mostly deeply ingrained habits: certainly, we cannot use the past as a 
legitimate reason for not addressing moral issues in the present.
6. It’s for their own good
In my view, none of the above reasons succeed in providing a justifying reason for 
killing animals for food on the basis of the interests of humans. The final reason I will 
consider takes a different tack: that eating animals is justifiable simply in relation to 
their own interests. If we did not eat meat, there would not be so many animals, 
according to this argument. There would be no cows living in the fields, no sheep 
grazing the hills, no chickens pecking around yards. Surely the lives animals live, 
prematurely shortened as they are, are better than no lives at all? In comparison with 
wild animals, their lot is a happy one: plentiful provision of food, protection from 
predators and veterinary care.15
There are two important responses to make to this argument. The first is that 
very many of the animals raised for human consumption in this country and 
worldwide live in conditions that it is hard to construe as preferable to no life at all: 
battery hens, stalled and crated pigs, and lengthy inhumane journeys to slaughter are 
the most glaring examples, but not the only ones. If keeping animals to kill for food is 
to be construed as a benefit to them, the lives they live must be lives worth living; for 
most people, eating only animals raised in this way would be to become practically 
vegetarian given the current state of farm animal welfare standards.
The second response to this argument is a broader one: is it the case that we are 
only prepared to make room for animals of material benefit to us? Nature reserves and 
conservation efforts speak of a recognition that we have a responsibility to nurture 
animal life irrespective of whether we have a direct economic interest in it. 
Undoubtedly, if there were a further widespread shift away from meat eating, there 
would be fewer farmed animals, but we could decide to find a continued place for 
these animals we have lived alongside for so long, and devoting fewer resources to 
raising animals for meat could also mean we could devote more space to populations 
of wild animals. The claim that we must kill and eat animals, 
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because otherwise we are not prepared to tolerate them at all, is to claim that we are 
incapable of making morally responsible decisions.
In this article I have examined six potential justifications for eating animals. 
Once my initial point is conceded—that the lives and welfare of animals matter—my 
judgement is that the reasons I have identified, taken individually or collectively, do 
not constitute a morally sufficient justification for killing animals for food. All those 
seeking to act responsibly in relation to other animals should choose a diet that 
depends as little as possible on their suffering and premature death. In a theological 
perspective, renouncing the unnecessary killing of our fellow creatures becomes a 
small sign of the present and future reality of God’s just and peaceful reign.16
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